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Abstract 
 
In the past 20 years, the Slovenia has been praised as the richest former 
socialist country, having accomplished the advancement from borrower into 
donor status at the World Bank and having entered the European Monetary 
Union as the first country from former socialist block. In the due course of 
transition to market, Slovenia adopted the gradualist approach to economic 
reform, emphasizing gradual privatization, excessive regulation of the labor 
market and financial sector as well as the slow stabilization of public finances. 
In this paper, we review macroeconomic performance of Slovenia in past two 
decades in a comparative perspective. The paper outlines the growth trajectory 
of Slovenia from the onset of Habsburg Empire to the present. We showed that 
until 1939, Slovenia has almost fully converged to the income per capita 
frontier of Austria and Italy while the income per capita diverged substantially 
in the period 1945-1990 from Western European frontier. We review the 
contours of labor market protectionism, state dominance in banking and 
financial sector and emergence of the corporate oligarchy as the main 
symptoms of stalled economic performance given a substantial differential in 
income per capita between Slovenia and EU15. Moreover, we demonstrate 
how former communist elites transformed into powerful networks of interest 
groups which preserved status quo from socialist period through systemic 
blockade of key economic reforms to stabilize public finances in the light of 
age-related pressures and to boost productivity growth and structural change. 
 
JEL Classification: E02, N13, N14, P16, P27,  
Keywords: post-socialist transition, macroeconomic stabilization, economic growth, political 
economy, Slovenia
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I. Introduction 
 
2011 year marked the twentieth anniversary of political independence in Slovenia.  It was a 
momentous date, marking the longest period of state independence since the country ceded 
from the former socialist Yugoslavia in 1991. After twenty years of political independence, it 
is essential to examine the country’s economic progress in more depth. 
 
In the last two decades, Slovenia has often been represented in the international media as 
the most successful ex-communist state, having accomplished Euro-Atlantic integration as 
well as being the first former socialist bloc country to enter the Eurozone. The consequence 
of judging the country’s economic performance on a purely comparative basis has been to 
neglect the deeper analysis of long-term macroeconomic patterns and determinants of 
growth. Four decades of flawed Marxist economics have produced distorted economic 
assumptions, and led to a significant divergence from academic developments in the Anglo-
Saxon world.  This has resulted in a virtually non-existent understanding of Slovenia’s past 
economic development. 
 
II. Macroeconomic History in a Nutshell 
 
It is often presumed that Slovenia had a poor economic performance before joining the 
socialist Yugoslavia, as measured by income per capita. Yet evidence from the Habsburg 
Empire (Good, 1994) suggests, via quantitative indices, that differences in terms of income 
per capita can be noted between different Slovenian regions. These estimates suggest that 
in 1913 regions such as Littoral, Carinthia and Styria sustained comparatively high levels of 
income per capita, comparable to that of Imperial Austria, whilst Carniola continually 
experienced low income per capita and a low rate of growth prior to World War 1. In 1913, 
the Littoral region (Gorizia, Gradiska, Trieste and parts of Istria) enjoyed the sixth-highest 
income per capita in Imperial Austria. At this time the level of nominal wages in Trieste had 
also converged to the Prague level. 
 
The emergence of the first Yugoslav state, renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929, was 
accompanied by divergent levels of income per capita across the country’s different regions. 
Although the Kingdom of Yugoslavia established national income accounts in 1938, 
estimates by Broadberry & Klein (2008) suggest that by 1937 Yugoslavia experienced one of 
the lowest levels of GDP per capita in Europe. In terms of constant 1990 international dollars, 
it was one of Europe’s most underdeveloped countries in 1938. An observation by the Library 
of Congress (1992) described pre-war Yugoslavia as a country of stark economic divergence; 
between the highly-developed North and the less-developed Southern regions. In 1937 
Yugoslav income per capita was 30 percent below the world average, whilst the eradication 
of feudalism left 75 percent of the population below the official poverty line. Slovenia however 
enjoyed a substantial advantage in terms of income per capita relative to other parts of the 
Kingdom. Ljubo Sirc has convincingly argued that by 1939 the level of real wages in Slovenia 
had been steadily converging to the Austrian level. The empirical regularities of income per 
capita patterns suggest an unequivocal convergence to the steady state. If Slovenia enjoyed 
income per capita 100 percent above Yugoslav average, then in 1937 the level of income per 
capita in Slovenia represented 78 percent of the Austrian level in the same year. It can thus 
be seen that the adoption of the socialist economic model led to a disastrous economic 
outcome. 
 
In 1950, the level of income per capita dropped to 34 percent of the Austrian level and 
remained intact ever since. One could not describe the Yugoslav miracle (Sapir, 1986) in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s as a period of sustained growth, since the engine of growth did 
not incorporate technological change and steady productivity gains.  Instead it was 
symptomatic of capital deepening based on foreign aid and credit-fuelled expansion amid 
rachitic productivity growth. From 1960 to 1975 Yugoslavia’s annual average growth rate was 
5.42 percent, whilst from 1975 to 1989 the annual rate of growth declined to 1.04 percent; 
one of the lowest in developing countries (Rodrik, 1998). The foregone experience of 
hyperinflation and the consequent collapse of the Yugoslav communist economic model 
resulted in a significant cumulative output decline during the transition from socialism to a 
market economy. 
 
III. Unpleasant Growth Arithmetic 
 
The evidence suggests that the socialist period was detrimental to the long-term rate of 
productivity growth.  This arose from the distortion of incentives inherent to the socialist 
economic system. From 1972 to 1980, Slovenia’s annual rate of economic growth tottered 
below the average of high-income socialist countries. The Czech Republic, Estonia and 
Poland grew at a far higher annual rate, revealing a pattern in income per capita 
convergence; even though the difference in the level of output per capita remained significant 
throughout the period. At this time output grew by 2.14 percent annually; far below the rate of 
growth in neighboring Austria (3.4 percent) and Italy (3.32 percent) during the same period.1 
This caused the divergence in per capita income, which occurred despite a substantially 
higher investment-to-GDP ratio. This translated into capital deepening without efficiency 
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 The estimates of long-run growth rates are based on International Macroeconomic Data Set, provided by U.S. 
Department of Agriculture: 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Macroeconomics/#HistoricalMacroTables 
gains, whilst the growth of total factor productivity stalled. As Figure 1 succinctly suggests, 
the level of real income per capita in Slovenia had stalled relative to the EU15 during the 
socialist period and did not grow significantly faster than the EU15 average throughout the 
post-socialist transition to signal permanent and robust cross-country convergence. 
 
Figure 1 [Near here] 
 
It is telling to compare this case with those of Slovenia and Malta, demonstrated in Figure 2. 
In 1950 Malta was one of the most impoverished countries in Southern Europe2 - falling 
behind even Bulgaria - whilst Slovenia enjoyed the highest income-per-capita level in Central 
Europe. However from 1960 to 1975 and in 1989, Malta sustained a 5.9 percent average rate 
of economic growth, which meant that it took 12 years for income per capita to double; whilst 
Slovenia’s average rate of growth meant that it took 30 years for income per capita to double. 
In 1991, both countries enjoyed the same per capita income. 
 
Figure 2 [Near here] 
 
The failure to boost the long-term rate of economic growth is key to understanding the 
narrowing gap in income per capita between Slovenia and other transition countries. For 
instance, Slovakia’s lower initial per capita income in 1991 would imply that in the long run 
the country will grow one percentage point faster than Slovenia on a permanent basis. In 
1991, therefore, Slovenia enjoyed 64 years of time-distance advantage ahead of Slovakia. 
Annual rate of growth estimates by the IMF (World Economic Outlook, 2011) suggest that in 
the short term Slovakia is set to grow by 2 percentage points faster than Slovenia. Hence the 
difference in the time to catch up would narrow to 26 years respectively. Differences in per 
capita income can ultimately be explained by differences in the institutional setup and the 
nature of public policy. Transition growth figures (Summers & Heston, 2007; Economic 
Research Service, 2010) suggest that long-term rates of growth are systematically higher in 
countries that have adopted shock therapy (Czech Republic, Poland)  than those which 
followed the gradualist approach to economic reform (Hungary, Slovenia). Countries that 
adopted shock therapy have also weathered the financial crisis better than gradualist 
countries; emphasizing the strength of a liberalized financial sector and the flexibility of 
labour markets in overcoming adverse economic downturns. 
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 Apostolides (2008) estimated the average GDP per capita growth rate for Malta during the interwar period 
(1921-1938) at 0.5-1.5 percent which characterized the country as the slowest-growing Southern European 
country prior to World War 2. 
 IV. The Rise of Gradualism 
 
Critiques of curvature in post-socialist transition over the last two decades have often been 
accompanied by rigorous and nonchalant attacks from the intellectual fathers of Slovenian 
transition. After ceding from Yugoslavia, Slovenia pursued a rigorously gradualist approach 
to transition. Macroeconomic indicators suggested a continuous output decline and 
hyperinflation; inherited from the Yugoslav era. One account by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) suggests that Slovenia suffered the largest 
cumulative output decline amongst high-income transition countries (Slovenia, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland), despite having adopted a gradualist approach to 
economic reform;  in an attempt to absorb the institutional shock that precipitated the early 
stage of transition. The ultimate decision to pursue gradualism rested mainly on the 
assumption that the composition of trade flows and enterprise restructuring would decrease 
in magnitude over time. 
 
The proposal by Jeffrey Sachs (Sachs & Pleskovic, 1994) to launch rapid privatization led to 
a significant disruption for post-communist nomenclature which favoured mass-privatization 
based on dispersed ownership – stemming from the premise that such an initiative would 
limit foreign direct investment. Early transition reinforced the mirage that social ownership 
could be efficient. The losses of the corporate and banking sector were facilitated by soft 
budget constraints that further delayed enterprise restructuring; the essential measure of 
maturity from post-socialist transition. A study by prominent authors (Pohl et. al, 1997) 
examined evidence from Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia - during the period 1992-1995 - to determine which economic policies were 
most conducive to enterprise restructuring. The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that rapid 
privatization - based on concentrated rather than dispersed ownership, and with hard budget 
constraints and restrained wage increases - is the best facilitator of enterprise restructuring. 
The Slovenian episode of privatization, which was based on dispersed ownership and the 
sale of assets by special investment funds, eventually became subject to a typical example 
of capture by insider-owners, who took an informational advantage by inflationary loans. This 
later became an insider-information spiral, where insiders gained considerable ownership 
premium at the expense of external shareholders, who suffered from a poor level of 
protection. 
 
The consequences of privatizing state-owned companies on an ‘insider’ basis proved 
disastrous when judging both the dynamics and the progress of enterprise restructuring. The 
evidence (Transition Report, 1998) suggests that by 1998 the Slovenian private sector was  
marked as having the lowest share in GDP amongst Central European states, constituting 
just 50 percent of the total, compared to 75 percent in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The 
fragility of the private sector gradually evolved into a rigid business environment and a 
sustained lack of incentives to instigate full enterprise restructuring. Moreover, the EBRD 
estimated that enterprise restructuring had stalled since the late 1990s - an estimation which 
was confirmed during the recent financial crisis when state-owned companies with poor 
corporate governance and insufficient restructuring were particularly affected/hit. 
 
The 2008/2009 financial crisis was no panacea to the fragile banking sector. The 
privatization of Nova Ljubljanska Banka (NLB), Slovenia’s biggest bank, had stalled several 
times.  This had occurred despite the fact that stress-tests had clearly suggested that the 
bank would not be able to withstand a bold systemic liquidity shock, given an over-leveraged 
balance sheet. Since the crisis, NLB losses have further been cushioned by continuous 
budgetary recapitalizations which have acted as a classic bailout mechanism. This suggests 
that the bank’s overall portfolio suffers heavily from a myriad of bad loans – a suggestion 
recently affirmed by the Moody rating agency, which further lowered the bank’s overall credit 
rating. 
 
The Government owns two-thirds of banking sector assets, including the three-largest banks. 
A concerted effort to boost far-reaching privatization and systematic restructuring has failed, 
mostly because of the pervasive influence of a network of former-communist politicians and 
businessmen. They favour direct influence in capturing the banking sector so as to establish 
and secure favourable lending relationships. So far, the absence of a privatization 
mechanism has produced a weak and unaccountable banking sector.  This encouraged the 
high quantity of direct loans for corporate takeovers prior to the crisis, which ignored 
corporate finance fundamentals and later triggered the collapse of the SBI20 stock market, - 
the most dramatic collapse of any stock market index in the history of advanced economies. 
The only viable option to liberalize the banking sector would be to enact a rigorous 
privatization of the state-owned banking sector to foreign institutional investors.  The degree 
of systemic and hidden corruption in the Slovenian financial sector is so high, that 
privatization to domestic owners would not resolve the inefficiencies produced by twenty 
years of state ownership. 
 
V. Corruption, Judiciary and the Oligarchs 
 
Although Slovenia’s ranking has significantly improved on Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index, the degree of hidden corruption is perceived as/understood to 
be significant and persistent. The rise of oligarchs, who have exacerbated state capture, 
allowing for corporate takeovers and the dismissal of regulatory authorities, is attributed 
above all to systemic corruption arising from influence. Administrative corruption, which is 
difficult to distinguish and ascertain as an empirical regularity, is assigned a minor role 
(Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2000). As Slovenia embarked on its gradualist approach to 
economic reform, former communist elites were given space/time to transform into a 
powerful network of politicians, civil servants and businessmen - a network accustomed to a 
predatory form of capitalism, shaped by the distorted moral foundations of communist 
ideology. 
 
Regulatory authorities and judiciaries were hindered from investigating and acting upon 
these attempts at state capture due to the lack of an independent judiciary. Such 
independence is defined as a separation from political influence, but it also includes an 
adherence to the principles of liberal democracy (such as the rule of law), adherence to 
contract enforcement and adherence to the principles of fairness in judicial trial. 
Consequently, the fragility of rule-of-law institutions in Slovenia increased the demand for 
public regulation, as a mechanism against social inequities arising from the redistribution of 
resources through rent-seeking and other unproductive (Alesina & Rodrik, 1994: Alesina & 
Angeletos, 2005; Murphy, et. al., 1993). The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that social 
distrust creates public demand for higher regulation, which further discourages the formation 
of social trust (Aghion et. al, 2008). In 1994, when Index of Economic Freedom released its 
annual report, Slovenia enjoyed the lowest and least stable functioning judicial system in 
Central Europe. In Figure 3, it can be seen that the level of economic freedom in Slovenia 
remained repeatedly low compared to other countries. The fact that the level of economic 
freedom in less-developed countries such as Rwanda, Cape Verde and Kazakhstan is 
perhaps the most compelling evidence suggesting that the socialist economic legacy with 
poor contract enforcement, inefficient public sector and endemic corruption has not been 
effectively dismantled at all. 
 
Figure 3 [Near here] 
 
One could trace the relative malfunctioning of the Slovenian judicial system to its legal origins.   
Recent studies (La Porta et. al. 2008) overwhelmingly suggest that countries with a civil law 
system suffer from lower economic outcomes than those with a common-law equivalent. But 
in our example, this particular notion fails to explain why post-socialist countries – who 
adhere to the latter yet fail to incorporate principles of substantive justice –, have performed 
poorly in comparison to countries with German, civil-law, legal origins.  These civil-law 
countries have generally managed   to at least ensure the continuity and stable functioning of 
the rule of law. The failure of the judicial system to adhere to these principles in post-socialist 
states has been caused mainly by the complete absence of lustration, which could expel 
former communist officials from chairmanships in public institutions – as occurred in the 
Czech Republic in the early 1990s. 
 
The very absence of effective contract enforcement allowed for various regulatory 
shortcomings, emerging from the fact that basic enforcement mechanisms were governed by 
the influence of post-communist networks, and not by independent legal principles. This 
influence extended beyond the scope of state administration, and began to also affect 
institutions in the conduct of private affairs. 
 
One example of this is the sustained influence of the former nomenclature in higher 
academia. This monopolisation worked to stifle the implementation of new ideas and policies. 
In various discussions and debates, the academic nomenclature has dismissed new 
proposals - such as labour market liberalization, openness to foreign direct investment and a 
flat-rate income tax - as being flawed, dangerous or primitive. The perils of the economic 
nationalism which facilitated the rise of the corporate oligarchy were considered almost non-
existent and were, by and large, ignored. Left-leaning media, oligarchic businessmen, 
nationalist politicians and (in)dependent academia argued forcefully for abandoning 
proposals of lower tax rates, privatization and labour market liberalization. In various public 
policy discussions, the intellectual architects of gradualism proved themselves ignorant of the 
consequences of economic nationalism. 
 
The early warnings of stock market fragility, occurring in the aftermath of the 1989 euphoria, 
were blissfully ignored - despite the fact that the Slovenian stock market echoed a similar 
pattern of volatility to China. In spite of the buoyant growth of the stock market - fuelling 
significant asset-price inflation - the stock market for major state-owned companies 
experienced a significant drive from fundamentals. Price-earnings ratios were surpassing net 
dividend yields considerably, suggesting a significant spike in insider-information trading, 
which leaves the shareholder to bear all the cost, and encourages insiders to take greater 
and greater risks. Eventually, the collapse of the SBITOP, the Slovenian blue-chip market, 
demonstrated the pitfalls of economic nationalism –a policy which had worked to boost 
oligarchic entrepreneurship by means of powerful nomenclature networks aided by academia, 
the media and short-sighted policies. Gradually, Slovenia began to witness the emergence of 
a Russian-style oligarchy which accumulated an enormous wealth through political channels. 
It did so by violating the rules of the game and overriding sound corporate governance 
principles. At the same time it amassed political power, ultimately facilitating state capture in 
the early stage of transition. Therefore, the Slovenian version of gradualism could be labeled 
as maintenance of the status quo, since key areas of economic reform - such as privitisation, 
competition policy, and the restructuring of enterprises - remained virtually intact. 
 
 
VI. Sclerosis of the Labour Market 
 
The evolution of the labour market in the early stages of transition was facilitated by a set of 
structural shocks that led to a downward adjustment in real wages. The labour market of the 
late 1980s and early 1990s was characterized by declining labour productivity and declining 
output per capita. It is nonetheless essential to underline the structural characteristics of the 
post-socialist labour market. As Woodward (1995) suggested, reported rates of 
unemployment in socialist Yugoslavia differed markedly from actual unemployment rates. 
Latent unemployment was a characteristic of the labour market in Slovenia at the onset of 
transition to a market economy. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the labour market 
suffered from a chronic lack of productive capacity, which reflected low actual comparative 
rates of human capital investment in a socialist economy. Therefore, Slovenia’s entry into 
post-socialist transition was earmarked by an excessive labour capacity that could not solve 
the problem of persistent latent unemployment. Excessive labour capacity stemmed 
generally from low levels of human capital, but particularly from the trade disintegration which 
followed cessation from the Yugoslav federation.  The Slovenian manufacturing sector 
suffered chronically after this event. 
 
The absence of large-scale enterprise restructuring complemented rising labour market 
rigidity, which was characterized by increased trade union power.  This effectively prevented 
productivity improvements at the firm level by shielding workers in both private and public 
sectors from competitive pressure to relocate talent into more productive uses and to 
facilitate human capital investment. Lack of enterprise restructuring had effectively acted as a 
substitute for efficiency gains from human capital investment. If human capital investment 
(Acemoglu, 1995) is not provided as an impetus for labour market transformation, excess 
labour capacity, an inherent characteristic of socialist unemployment, is channeled through 
higher rates of unemployment. Trade unions, once the hallmark of the socialist economy, 
have swiftly established an extremely rigid system of labour market institutions by 
establishing collective bargaining schemes as the means of avoiding the facilitation of 
productivity improvements through human capital investment. 
 
The architects of gradualism had not envisaged the transformation of the labour market at all. 
The rigidity of the labour market mechanism, measured by the regulation of hiring and firing 
and the magnitude of labour cost per effective unit of output, acted merely as a substitute for 
comprehensive restructuring and hindered the necessary relocations of talent, skill and 
human capital investment. 
 
The notion of labour market liberalization originally proposed by Jeffrey Sachs in 1994 was 
dismissed not only by the media but also by politicians and trade union leaders who 
emphasized temporary job security concerns in the early stage of transition. But, as Milton 
Friedman once brilliantly noted, nothing is as permanent as a temporary government 
programme. In the early years of transition, the labour market did not gradually evolve into a 
mechanism for the reallocation of talent and human capital, but into an unhealthy system of 
job security. This was especially so for public-sector workers where dismissals have been 
impossible to enforce, therefore emanating in a deadweight loss, compensated by an 
increase in the share of government spending as a proportion of total GDP. 
 
In 1992, the rate of real wages for civil servants and public sector employees grew 
considerably. By 1995, government spending as a share of GDP had increased from 41.1 
percent in 1991 to 54 percent. The rise of real wages  for civil servants has been problematic 
mostly because the adjustment of real wages  has not been linked  to the short-term rate of 
productivity growth; exacerbating significant pressure on labour costs and, hence, the annual 
rate of inflation. The boons of public sector employment naturally resulted in the diversion of 
labour resources from the private to the public sector. It should not be concluded that the 
private sector’s labour market is unaffected by corruption, rigidity and shortcomings of 
unadjusted wage determination however, since these characteristics are intrinsic to the 
labour market in contemporary Slovenia. 
 
A highly rigid labour market, plagued by union intervention in the determination of wages and 
labour contracts, is highly susceptible to moral hazard; since unionised workers enjoy 
considerable wage premiums, yet also create a deadweight loss from a rigid labour supply. 
In the case of the public sector, this is borne by taxpayers. The empirical evidence (Mattina & 
Gunnarsson, 2007) suggests that despite substantially high earnings for public sector 
workers, the public sector suffers from low expenditure efficiency, particularly in health care, 
education and social protection: 
 
“Spending on health care, education, and social protection is relatively high in 
Slovenia without achieving correspondingly better outcomes. Inefficiencies 
appear to stem from the financing mechanisms for social services, institutional 
arrangements, and the weak targeting of social benefits. In addition, the 
composition of spending appears to be strongly tilted towards nondiscretionary 
items that reduce the fiscal room for maneuver. Greater flexibility is needed to 
facilitate the reallocation of relatively inefficient expenditure into higher priorities. 
In this manner, medium-term expenditure rationalization can focus on reducing 
inefficient outlays rather than restraining traditionally flexible components of the 
budget, such as public investment.” 
 
The most formative characteristic of the post-socialist labour market in Slovenia is a benign 
productivity growth which remained inherent to the structure of the labour market. 
Throughout the transition, the gains from rising productivity have been modest. Figure 4 
demonstrates that throughout the transition period, the growth of labour productivity, 
ultimately driving the level of income per capita, has been characterised by slow growth and 
yet substantial gap between Slovenia and EU15. In 2006, the level of labour productivity has 
not increased at all. Moreover, from 2006 to 2010, the level of labour productivity 
deteriorated from 83.1 percent of the EU average to 81.6 percent. The convergence of 
productivity took a full-fledged course within the EU. Unfortunately, the level of productivity in 
Slovenia has converged by very little to the frontier of high-income countries in the EU. On 
the other hand, countries that enforced shock therapy and growth-oriented policies such as 
Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia have experienced a steady convergence of labour 
productivity to the high-income frontier, although the difference is still substantial. However, 
high-income transition countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia) have increased their 
productivity levels substantially relative to Slovenia. In 1991, Slovenia sustained two-thirds of 
the EU productivity level whilst Slovakia’s productivity level represented half the level of the 
EU average. As mentioned above, productivity growth in Slovenia has stalled since 2006 
whilst Slovakia has experienced brisk productivity growth. In 2010, Slovakia’s level of labour 
productivity represented 82.6 percent of the EU average whilst Slovenia achieved about 81.9 
percent of the EU average. This clearly demonstrates the benefits of growth-oriented policies 
pursued in Slovakia since 2000, and the pitfalls of consensus-based economic policies which 
are characterised by high taxation, rigid labour markets and a state-dominated financial 
sector. 
 
Figure 4 [Near here] 
 
Whilst Slovakia has begun to reform its taxation system, privatise its state-owned industries 
and liberalise its financial sector, Slovenian policymakers have merely revived the old notions 
of social justice as a way to maintain the status quo.  This has yielded immense political 
rents by favouring particular interest groups (Mrkaic & Pezdir, 2007) in the labour market.  
Yet rent-seeking without system-wide productivity growth has resulted in productivity 
stagnation to such a degree that Slovenia can no longer boast the highest productivity level 
amongst other post-socialist states. 
 
 
 
VII. State Capture of Public Finance 
 
The transition to political independence was marked by acute problems of poor infrastructure 
and low-efficiency labour, which required systemic restructuring.  Yet the extensive latent 
unemployment rate ultimately translated into significant structural unemployment.  Uniquely, 
policymakers chose to address persistent structural unemployment by altering the 
parameters of the public pension system. In particular, economic policy chose to follow the 
gradualist prescription by lowering the effective age of retirement to very low levels, enabling 
the structurally unemployed to avert human capital investment in the labour market and enter 
retirement. Although lowering the effective retirement age to a level below actuarially justified 
levels proved a popular political measure, it posed a significant threat to the long-term 
stability of public finance, which gradualism had simply overlooked. 
 
The impact of macroeconomic disequilibrium was immediate. From 1990 to 1995, the level of 
government spending increased to over 54 percent of GDP.  Spending on the elderly also 
grew significantly. The divergence of old-age spending from actuarially-fair levels and the 
subsidization of early-retirement has placed an irreversible burden on the stability of long-
term public finance. In the last two decades, when economic policymakers became aware of 
the consequences of these transitional retirement policies, any attempt to increase the 
effective age of retirement has been hailed by trade unions as the destruction of the 
Slovenian social state. This rhetoric, reminiscent of the old socialist days, has proved 
significantly detrimental for the reform of the public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system. 
 
Projections by the European Commission have suggested that Slovenia possesses one of 
the most rapidly ageing populations in Europe; only behind the Southern part of the continent. 
Estimates suggest that by 2030 40 percent of the population will be dependent on age-
related spending. By 2050, the old-age dependency ratio is forecast to increase by an 
additional 15 percentage points, reaching 55.6 percent in the corresponding year. The total 
fertility rate has also been declining since the late 1980s. For the period 2005-2010, 
Slovenia’s average fertility rate was eleventh lowest in the world.  This, coupled with a 
retirement age which in 2008 was around 59 years on average, poses significant threats to 
Slovenia’s future. 
 
Continuous lowering of the effective retirement age has exerted a strong pressure on the rise 
of age-related expenditures. By 2010, public pension expenditure represented 11 percent of 
GDP.  By 2050, expenditure on public pensions is forecast to reach 18.3 percent of GDP- 
only falling behind Portugal (20.8 percent of GDP) and Cyprus (19.8 percent of GDP). The 
extraordinary increase in the level of age-related expenditure is not exclusively attributable to 
the changing demographic landscape, despite Slovenia’s significantly aging population. 
 
The most distinctive characteristic of the Slovenian PAYG pension system is unearned 
benefits. Although the notion of unearned benefits is the cornerstone of social justice, its 
Slovenian manifestation also deviates substantially from the rationale of actuarial fairness, 
which forms the basis of the contributory principle in PAYG pension. Unearned pension 
benefits have been a key feature of Slovenia’s waning public pension system. Recipients 
include former generals, war veterans, civil servants, public officials, academics and even 
chimney-sweeps. These recipients have accumulated net pension wealth not on the basis of 
contributory principles, but as the result of special privileges, sustained by the continuation of 
rent-seeking and interest-group influence in Slovenia. In 2010, the magnitude of unearned 
pension benefits amounted to €367 million, or just over 1 percent of GDP.3 Moreover the net 
present value of pension liabilities increases considerably if one takes into account future 
benefits.  A recent study by the Bank for International Settlements has estimated that the 
size of Slovenian net pension liabilities will increase to 291 percent of GDP by 2050, (if future 
net pension liabilities are discounted by 3 percent).  This amounts to the second-highest ratio 
in the Eurozone, only behind Portugal. 
 
The removal of unearned pension benefits from the public pension system would 
substantially reduce the pressure on long-term fiscal solvency. It would also reinforce the 
importance of the contributory principle and actuarial fairness in the state pension. The 
magnitude of unearned benefits embedded in the public pension system demonstrates state 
capture in the public pension system. It also demonstrates the persistence of interest-group 
pressure and their strength as powerful coalitions. In Slovenia this phenomenon has 
translated into the near fiscal insolvency of the state pension system in the medium term. 
Gradualism’s strategy of inducing early-retirement in order to reduce unemployment has 
failed. 
 
The result of this strategy has been to produce significant intergenerational income 
imbalances, as well as further rigidities in the labour market and low employment growth.  
Post-gradualist resistance to comprehensive pension reform has also indicated a preference 
for maintaining the status quo and appeasing powerful interest groups. Yet maintenance of 
the status quo threatens to ultimately result in fiscal default. 
 
                                                 
3
 I am thankful to Bernard Brščič for providing estimates on the cost of unearned pension benefits in 
the share of GDP.  
VIII. Towards Shock Therapy 
 
Slovenia’s economic performance in the last twenty years was initially marked by 
macroeconomic stabilization and low levels of public debt. However from the second half of 
the 1990s, the rate of total factor productivity growth –which indicates the level of 
technological progress - had stalled (Mrkaic, 2002), reaching negligible levels. The 
stagnation of labour productivity from 2006 onwards suggests that economic growth in 
Slovenia has been characterized by a capital deepening that eventually diminished the rate 
of economic growth.  Slovenia’s transition to market had not been accompanied by 
enterprise restructuring and large-scale privatization. Unlike other high-income transition 
countries, a thorough privatization of state-owned companies did not occur, often being 
undermined by economic nationalism and resistance to foreign direct investment. This lack of 
enterprise restructuring boosted a wave of resistance to structural change which, coupled 
with poor contract enforcement, eventually led to a weak and fragile private sector, 
accounting for little more than 50 percent of GDP. 
 
A rigid and inflexible labour market, the most penetrating socialist legacy, has generated rigid 
wage determination and rigid employment legislation, characterized by significant trade union 
intervention. The intervention of unions in the centralisation of collective bargaining and the 
enforcement of inflexibility in the labour market has resulted in disastrous consequences. 
Empirical evidence suggests a significant correlation between the degree of a rigidity and 
insulation from competitive pressures in a labour market and low productivity growth.  The 
aforementioned features of the Slovenian labour market has caused the stagnation of 
productivity growth to such an extent that in 2007 Slovakia overtook Slovenia in the rate of 
productivity convergence to the other members of the EU. 
 
The 2008/2009 financial crisis has caused a significant decline in aggregate production and 
the slow subsequent growth since 2010. Growth prospects in the medium term suggest that 
Slovenian income per capita is not converging with high-income European countries.  To 
boost long-term economic growth and facilitate technological progress, the course of 
economic policy should not aim to preserve the status quo, a principle which has dominated 
national politics ever since political independence. Instead, economic policies should 
prioritise long-term growth. 
 
First, policy reform should include rigorous and penetrating reformation of the tax system, 
aimed at the abolition of corporate income tax and the adoption of flat-rate income tax; in 
order to encourage labour supply and productivity growth. In fact, Slovenia is suffering from 
one of the highest effective tax burdens, measured as a share of GDP. In 2009 the effective 
tax rate, which includes social security and mandatory health insurance contributions, 
amounted to 55 percent - one of the highest rates in the world. 
 
Secondly, it should begin to liberalise the labour market. Much empirical evidence suggests 
the negative relationship between labour market rigidity and productivity growth. A 
comparison of overall labour market regulation in a cross-section of OECD countries 
suggests that the labour market in Slovenia is constrained by excessively-regulated wage 
determination, employment contracts and entry-exit conditions, making it one of the most 
regulated labour markets in the OECD after Portugal and Germany. 
 
Thirdly, policies should aim at a transparent and immediate privatization of state-owned 
production on a significant scale, as well as liberalization of the banking and financial sector, 
whilst ensuring effective enforcement of competition protection. Poorly enforced competition 
protection and state dominance in banking, finance and telecommunications is the major 
constraint for maturing from a transitional to a market economy. The evidence again 
suggests that better corporate governance, financial fundamentals and market outcomes 
follow privatization. Privatization and the encouragement of market competition is perhaps 
the simplest way to tackle the power of interest groups who extract immense rents from the 
public ownership of large-scale firms. 
 
Finally, the reform of a fragile and fiscally-bankrupt pension system should not be postponed. 
The net pension liabilities currently implicit in the state pension system have raised serious 
concerns over the actuarial fairness of a PAYG system which ought to incorporate the 
compulsory principle (as is usually typical). With an aging population, this reform should 
facilitate the introduction of mandatory private savings accounts and initiate the transition to 
fully-funded private pension schemes. The transition should also ensure the better regulation 
of pension funds.  This could be done by enforcing a rigorous compliance with the principles 
actuarial fairness, and opening up private pension funds to foreign competition. 
 
These suggestions present the first step to boosting long-term growth in Slovenia, a process 
which must begin by tackling the legacies of its recent economic history. This paper does not 
provide a definitive account of the mistakes of transition, but instead it attempts to discuss 
the negative consequences of the gradualist preference for maintaining the status quo. This 
has persisted throughout transition, to such an extent that Slovenia has started suffer the 
consequence of policies that prioritise social justice above sound economic principles.
IX. References 
 
Acemoglu, D. (1995). “Reward Structures and the Allocation of Talent.” European Economic 
Review, 39: 17-33. 
 
Aghion, P., Algan, Y., Cahuc, P. & Shleifer, A. (2008). “Regulation and Distrust.” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 125(3): 1015-1049 
 
Alesina, A. & Angeletos, G.M. (2005). “Corruption, Inequality and Fairness.” Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 52(7): 1227-1244. 
 
Alesina, A. & Rodrik, D. (1994). “Distributive Politics and Economic Growth.” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 109(2): 465-490. 
Apostolides, A. (2008). “How Similar to South-Eastern Europe were the Islands of Cyprus 
and Malta in terms of Agricultural Output and Credit? Evidence during the Interwar Period?” 
MPRA Paper No. 9968. 
 
Broadberry, S. & Klein, A. (2008). “Aggregate and Per Capita GDP in Europe, 1870-2000: 
Continental, Regional and National Data with Changing Boundaries.” University of Warwick. 
 
Easterly, W. & Bruno, M. (1995). “Inflation Crises and Long-Run Growth.” World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 1517. 
 
Economic Research Service (2011). International Macroeconomic Data Set. U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Washington D.C. 
 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Transition Report 2010: Recovery and 
Reform. London, UK (November: 2010). 
 
European Commission. 2006. “The Impact of Ageing on Public Expenditure: Projections for 
EU25 Member States on Pensions, Health Care, Long-Term Care, Education and 
Unemployment Transfers (2004-2050).” European Economy, Special Report No.1. Brussels: 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs. 
 
Hellman, J.S, Jones, G. & Kaufmann, D. (2000). “Seize the Day, Seize the State: State 
Capture, Corruption and Influence in Transition.” World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 2444. 
 
Good, D. (1994). “Economic Lag of Central and Eastern Europe: Income Estimates for the 
Habsburg Successor States, 1870-1910.” Journal of Economic History, 54(4): 869-891. 
 
International Monetary Fund. World Economic Outlook. Washington D.C. (April: 2011). 
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F. & Shleifer, A. (2008). “Economic Consequences of Legal 
Origins.” Journal of Economic Literature, 46(2): 285-332. 
 
Mattina, T. & Gunnarsson, V. (2007). “Budget Rigidity and Expenditure Efficiency in 
Slovenia.” IMF Working Paper No. 07/131. 
 
Mink, R. (2007) “General Government Pension Obligations in Europe.” IFC Bulletin, 28(1): 
199-209. 
 
Mrkaic, M. (2002) “The Growth of Total Factor Productivity in Slovenia.” Journal of Post-
Communist Economies, 14(4): 445-454. 
 
Mrkaic, M. & Pezdir, R. (2007) “Transition and Political Markets: Post-War German versus 
Post-Socialist Slovenian Reconstruction.” Economic Affairs, 27(4): 58-64. 
 
Murphy, K.M, Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W. (1993). “Why is Rent-Seeking so Costly for Growth?” 
American Economic Review, 83(2): 409-414.  
 
Pohl, G., Anderson, R.E., Claessens, S. & Djankov, S. (1997) “Privatization and 
Restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe.” World Bank Technical Working Paper No. 368. 
 
Rodrik, D. (1998) “Globalization, Social Conflict and Economic Growth.” World Economy 
21(2): 145-158. 
Sachs, J. (1995). “Reforms in Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union in the Light of East 
Asian Experiences.” NBER Working Paper No. 5404. 
 
Sachs, J. D. & Pleskovic, B. (1994). “Political Independence and Economic Reform in 
Slovenia.” In Transition in Eastern Europe - Volume I: Country Studies, ed. O. J. Blanchard, 
K. Frooth and J. D. Sachs. Chicago: NBER and University of Chicago Press, 191-230. 
 
Sapir, A. (1980). “Economic Growth and Factor Substitution: What Happened to the 
Yugoslav Miracle?” The Economic Journal, 90(358): 294-313. 
 
Sirc, L. (1961). “Two Decades of Economic Planning in Yugoslavia.” New Individualist 
Review 5(1), Winter 1968. 
 
Sirc, L. (1979). The Yugoslav Economy Under Self-Management. New York: St.Martin’s 
Press. 
 
Sirc, L. (2010). Brezpotja socializma. Ljubljana: Slovenska Matica. 
 
Summers, R. and Heston, A. (1991). “The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of 
International Comparisons, 1950-1988.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(2): 327-368. 
 
Woodward, S. L. (1995). Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy of Yugoslavia, 
1945-1990. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
X. Appendix: List of Figures 
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Figure 2: Anatomy of Long-Run Growth Pattern in Slovenia and Malta 
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Figure 3: Index of Economic Freedom in Selected Countries 
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Figure 4: Labour Productivity Growth in Slovenia, Slovakia and EU15 
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